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INTRODUCTION
Vancouver’s Stanley Park is full of living things, but can it be a person?
Stanley Park is a 1,000 acre stretch of park land located along the City of
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Vancouver’s northwest peninsula. Under Canadian law, Stanley Park is
owned by the federal government, under a renewable lease to the City of
Vancouver, and is under the jurisdiction and management of the elected
Vancouver Parks and Recreation Board. It is not just any park, but the crown
jewel of one of Canada’s most populated regions, winning accolades like
“top park in the entire world” by TripAdvisor.1 It boasts cycling and
pedestrian paths that hug the wavy coast, beaches with turquoise-blue water
that fill to the brim in summer months, and peaceful lakes for cranky swans.
The prominence of lawn bowling and a tea house speak to the city’s colonial
origins. However, Vancouver is located on unceded land, which means that
the land was never formally surrendered by the Musqueam, Squamish, and
Tsleil-Waututh First Nations (Coast Salish First Nations).2 The land upon
which the park sits was once one of the largest settlements of Coast Salish
inhabitants, who lived along the Pacific Northwest. For centuries, the land
had economic, residential, political, and spiritual importance to Indigenous
peoples.3 Reminders of these inhabitants are scant and certainly do not
include details of the trespassing claims won by the municipal and federal
governments in 1926, which displaced Coast Salish inhabitants who had
used what is now the park for economic and residential purposes.
Parks are an especially important site of city power. Parks serve as a
compelling backdrop to a city’s mystique, determining which spaces will be
used for particular activities (cycling, walking), but not others (sleeping,
urinating). They are demarcated and set aside from the development that
permeates urban spaces, yet at the same time sites of social control. Parks
also have important economic, social, and political significance to a broad
range of people and entities, often including Indigenous communities, and
are home to dwellers, visitors, and non-human species, including plants and
animals.4
Stanley Park, located in Vancouver, embodies these property tensions,
with unique legalities that continue to this day. It holds multiple roles. As
Part I details, it comprises the unceded, ancestral traditional Indigenous lands
of great economic, political, and spiritual value to Coast Salish Peoples, and
was home to many families until the mid-1950s. It remains federal land,
purportedly set aside for military purposes, then leased to the newly-created
1. Amy Judd, Stanley Park Named ‘Top Park in the Entire World’, STANLEY PARK
ECOLOGY SOC’Y (June 17, 2014), https://stanleyparkecology.ca/2014/06/18/stanley-parknamed-top-park-entire-world/ [https://perma.cc/MZ8J-M7XK].
2. Douglas C. Harris, Property and Sovereignty: An Indian Reserve and a Canadian
City, 50 U.B.C. L. REV. 321, 332, 336 (2017).
3. “Indigenous” is a broad term for those who identify as the original peoples of North
America and their descendants. “First Nations” are Indigenous governments.
4. See generally Udi Ofer, Occupy The Parks: Restoring the Right to Overnight Protest
in Public Parks, 39 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1155 (2012).
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City of Vancouver.5 It is also a coveted, romanticized urban space that is the
jewel of a Canadian municipality.
In the last decade, the Supreme Court of Canada has debunked terra
nullius as a binding legal principle,6 but not before the claim permitted
colonial powers to acquire Indigenous lands for their own purposes —
including those granted to municipal corporations, encompassing spaces
later turned into public parks. First Nations and municipalities across
Canada are grappling with how to move forward in the governance of such
spaces, introducing legal and policy mechanisms to ‘reconcile’ with
Indigenous Peoples in relation to urban lands. Many municipalities are
specifically road mapping relationship-building in relation to park spaces.
At the time that this article was written, the Vancouver Parks Board was
undertaking a colonial audit to understand the history and future of Stanley
Park,7 had advanced co-management with First Nations,8 and the City of
Vancouver had endorsed a strategy to implement the United Nations
Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, together with the three
Coast Salish nations.9
This Article, considers personhood, a mechanism that has been used in
other jurisdictions — including cities — to legally reconfigure land

5. Indenture Agreement, City of Vancouver-King Edward VII, Nov. 1, 1908, Vancouver
City Clerk’s Department.
6. In Tsilhqot’in Nation v. British Columbia, [2014] 2 S.C.R. 256, 292 (Can.), the
Supreme Court of Canada stated that “[t]he doctrine of terra nullius (that no one owned the
land prior to European assertion of sovereignty) never applied in Canada.” ¶ 69. Many
scholars have called into question this statement, given that the same paragraph of Tsilhqot’in
Nation states, “[a]t the time of assertion of European sovereignty, the Crown acquired radical
or underlying title to all the land in the province.” See id. See also John Borrows, The
Durability of Terra Nullius: Tsilhqot’in Nation v British Columbia, 48 U.B.C. L. REV. 701,
702 (2015) (“If that land was owned by Indigenous peoples prior to the assertion of European
sovereignty, one wonders how the Crown acquired title in the same land by merely asserting
sovereignty, without a version of terra nullius being deployed. The Crown’s claim to
underlying title on this basis ‘does not make sense.’”).
7. See Letter from Gen. Manager, Vancouver Bd. of Parks & Recreation, to Park Bd.
Chair & Comm’rs 1, 3 (July 16, 2018) [hereinafter Exploring Park Board’s Colonial Roots
and Current Practices], https://parkboardmeetings.vancouver.ca/2018/20180723/REPORTExploringParkBoardsColonialRootsAndCurrentPractices-20180723.pdf
[https://perma.cc/GS3W-35K8].
8. Commissioner Mackinnon, Motion for Co-Management of Vancouver Parklands with
the Musqueam, Squamish, and Tsleil-Waututh Nations, Vancouver Bd. of Parks & Recreation
(Nov. 29, 2021), https://parkboardmeetings.vancouver.ca/2021/20211213/MOTIONCoMgmtOfVancouverParklandsMSTNations-20211213.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5QWGS8LG].
9. See Council approves groundbreaking UNDRIP strategy for Vancouver, CITY OF
VANCOUVER (Oct. 26, 2022), https://vancouver.ca/news-calendar/council-approvesgroundbreaking-undrip-strategy-for-vancouver.aspx [https://perma.cc/D23N-T22Q].
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ownership.10 Te Urewara, once a national park in New Zealand, the Atrato
River in Colombia, and the Magpie and Fraser Rivers in Canada became
legal “persons” after decades of advocacy by Indigenous Peoples. These
natural resources now have rights, a new material and representational
making of property that centres a governance role for Indigenous Peoples.
This Article asks what personhood could mean for Stanley Park and for
Canadian urban parks more broadly. In particular, it explores whether
personhood is a legal innovation that reshapes property or, instead, whether
it perpetuates the colonial appropriation in the existing legal framework.
With the notion that property sets out power over the owned objects, but also
the owning subjects, the Article first goes back in time to explore the legal
technicalities used by municipal bodies to claim power over Stanley Park.
Moving forward to today, this Article advocates for a commitment to the
nuances of local Indigenous-led movements and specific Indigenous laws,
and knowledge and attention to the colonial structures that form existing
property rights and governance models within local governments, rather than
a quick attachment to potentially emancipatory forms of property.
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I provides background on the
legal history of Stanley Park, located in Vancouver, Canada, with a focus on
the displacement of the original Indigenous inhabitants. Part II examines
parks as a unique legal space, explaining initiatives taken by local
government to acknowledge colonialism and displacement. Part III explores
recent efforts across the world to recognize the rights of nature for resources
such as rivers and parks. In Part IV, the Article examines what it would mean
for Stanley Park to be granted personhood status and, in particular, whether
this action would be represent a legal innovation that would legitimately
recognize Indigenous laws.
I.

THE LEGAL HISTORY OF VANCOUVER’S STANLEY PARK

This Part starts by traveling to the past in order to begin to understand the
lore of the 400-hectare area that comprises Stanley Park, one of the largest
urban park spaces in North America. Coast Salish communities inhabited
these spaces from time immemorial and throughout the decades that
preceded and followed what is now British Columbia joining Canada.11

10. By ‘ownership’ I acknowledge the complex relationship between fee simple title and
legal tenure, on the one hand, with other forms of entitlement, including Indigenous and
Aboriginal claims under Canadian and other legal systems. See generally ROBERT NICHOLS,
THEFT IS PROPERTY! DISPOSSESSION AND CRITICAL THEORY (2020).
11. “Time immemorial” is a term used to describe the long-standing, undisputed
possession, and use of lands by Indigenous Peoples. See Lorraine Weir, “Time Immemorial”
and Indigenous Rights: A Genealogy and Three Case Studies (Calder, Van der Peet,
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There were Indigenous dwelling sites, burial grounds, transportation
corridors, and economic development that were well known to colonial
figures.12 European settlers claimed rights to the Stanley Park peninsula in
1859, and the Dominion government, which would later become the
Government of Canada, designated the site as a military reserve.13 As Renisa
Mawani states:
The making of Stanley Park was a long and protracted process that was
characterised by a series of local and national struggles around space and
identity. While the Dominion government had set aside the region around
Burrard Inlet for military purposes, the city had its own ideas as to what
could be done with this beautiful and valuable property. The city of
Vancouver was incorporated in April 1886. Only one month later, officials
began discussing ways in which they could lease the government reserve.
Because the threat of an American invasion was no longer imminent, city
officials assumed that the land was of little value to the Department of
Militia and Defense. Although (and perhaps because) the population of
white colonists was still very small, civic officials insisted that what the
city desperately needed was to establish a colonial presence and to foster a
sense of community. A park was proposed as a suitable site for the
cultivation of a British identity in the newly formed frontier city. 14

Vancouver City Council’s first order of business on May 12, 1886, depicted
in Figure 1, was to pass a resolution asking the federal government to convey
a lease to the city of the peninsula “in order that it be used by the inhabitants
of said City of Vancouver as a park.”15 The federal government agreed, for
a nominal one dollar per year. The lease was renewed for ninety-nine years
in 1908 and again more recently.16 The presence of Indigenous communities

Tsilhqot’in) from British Columbia, 26 J. HIST. SOCIO. 383, 383–89 (2013) (reviewing
critically the courts’ use of the term “time immemorial”).
12. See R. Mawani, Imperial Legacies (Post)Colonial Identities: Law, Space and the
Making of Stanley Park, 1859–2001, 7 L. TEXT CULTURE 96, 104–11 (2003),
https://ro.uow.edu.au/ltc/vol7/iss1/5 [https://perma.cc/7K7D-C582].
13. See JEAN BARMAN, STANLEY PARK’S SECRET 86–88 (2005).
14. Mawani, supra note 12, at 107. Mawani notes, “[n]ot surprisingly, there was never
any mention here of the Squamish, Musqueam or Tsleil-Watuth and their ancestral territorial
claims.” Id. at 108.
15. Id. at 104–06.
16. See Recommendation from Frieda Schade, Parks Cent. Area Div. Manager, Plan.,
Pol’y & Env’t Dep’t, to Env’t & Parks Comm. (Mar. 28, 2013) (on file with Greater
Vancouver Reg’l Dist. Bd.), https://fraseropolis.files.wordpress.com/2013/06/regional-parksservice-review.pdf [https://perma.cc/D43N-3D5S]; see also Stanley Park – Leasing the land,
BEAUTIFUL B.C. (July 28, 2018), https://beautifulbritishcolumbia.net/2018/07/28/stanleypark-leasing-the-land/ [https://perma.cc/W3PZ-2LNM].
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living in Stanley Park was well known to authorities throughout this time, as
seen in the map at Figure 2.17

Figure 1: Vancouver City Council, 1886
In 1887, Park Board staff destroyed village sites, including part of
X̱wáýx̱way, evicting residents in order to build the first park road.18 This
was the first of a series of events critical to the legal displacement of
Indigenous residents in urban areas.19
The construction revealed

17. See HENRY CREASE, MAP OF BURRARD INLET WITH PENCIL NOTATIONS (1863); see also
Jane Turner, George Vancouver Research Material, in LAMB RESEARCH COLLECTION (Univ.
of B.C., 2013), https://ro.uow.edu.au/ltc/vol7/iss1/ [https://perma.cc/3HPW-BZRL].
18. See Mawani, supra note 12, at 120.
19. See id. See generally GLEN SEAN COULTHARD, RED SKIN, WHITE MASKS: REJECTING
THE COLONIAL POLITICS OF RECOGNITION (Univ. Minn. Press, 2014) (describing academic
works from Indigenous authors exploring the displacement of Indigenous Peoples in Canadian
cities); Heather Dorries, “Welcome to Winnipeg”: Making Settler-Colonial Urban Space in
“Canada’s Most Racist City,” in SETTLER CITY LIMITS: INDIGENOUS RESURGENCE AND
COLONIAL VIOLENCE IN THE URBAN PRAIRIE WEST 25 (Univ. Manitoba Press, 2019); Heather
Dorries, Planning as Property: Uncovering the Hidden Racial Logic of a Municipal Nuisance
By-law, 27 J. L. & SOC. POL’Y, 80, 80–102 (2017); Julie Tomiak, Contesting the Settler City:
Indigenous Self-Determination, New Urban Reserves, and the Neoliberalization of
Colonialism, 49 ANTIPODE 928, 928–45; Julie Tomiak, Unsettling Ottawa: Settler
Colonialism, Indigenous Resistance, and the Politics of Scale, 25 CAN. J. URB. RSCH. 8, 8–21
(2016).
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archaeological sites throughout the peninsula, including burial sites, with
remains taken to Ottawa.20 City workers also removed Indigenous families
through the creation of recreational sites, including an athletic ground and
cricket pitches.21
Governments used other means, unsuccessfully for a number of years, to
displace Indigenous residents in and adjacent to the park. For example, in
1888 the City of Vancouver offered compensation to those whose houses had
been destroyed in relation to park construction, but residents refused after
seeking legal advice.22 Another somewhat more fraught example comes
from Coal Harbour, where a long-standing Coast Salish family with a
matriarch named Mary See-em-ia successfully defended her rights to land
that straddled the park and what became a city street. Through Mary Seeem-ia successfully challenged the adverse possession of three acres of her
land, the parcel was subsequently fractured into smaller and smaller pieces,
and eventually the City acquired it.23

Figure 2: Close-up of Map Burrard Inlet, 1891. 24
In 1897, the ownership of Deadman’s Island off Brockton Point, a site
with Indigenous inhabitants in Stanley Park, was contested between British
Columbia and the federal government, and the court ultimately settled in

20. See Sean Kheraj, Stanley Park, CANADIAN ENCYCLOPEDIA (June 8, 2017),
https://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.ca/en/article/stanley-park
[https://perma.cc/YXZ4G9BB].
21. See BARMAN, supra note 13, at 103–04.
22. See id. at 96–98.
23. Id. at 124.
24. Item: Map 50 – Burrard Inlet, CITY OF VANCOUVER ARCHIVES,
https://searcharchives.vancouver.ca/burrard-inlet-6 [https://perma.cc/C8CX-5FJ2] (last
visited July 25, 2022).
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favour of the latter.25 Later, the City wanted to issue eviction orders against
those dwelling on Deadman Island, now deemed “squatters” in Figure 3.
Upon review, the Vancouver City solicitor concluded that, “the Indians
remain on sufferance to the Crown, and cannot be interfered with by the City
of Vancouver.”26 These efforts culminated in a legal action for trespass
brought in 1923 to “take all necessary steps in the name of the [federal
government] and the city of Vancouver to institute proceedings in the Courts
for the ejectment of the squatters.”27 Three cases were initially launched by
the City of Vancouver, with the Government of Canada later joining as a coplaintiff. The governments argued for a declaration of title to determine the
rights of the squatters against the Crown and the City:
The cases centred on the concept of adverse possession, whereby
occupation that went unchallenged for a specified period of time overrode
legal ownership. Occupation has to be open, actual, exclusive, undisturbed
and continuous over a specified time period in order to maintain a claim for
adverse possession. Occupation had to be so blatant that any owner paying
due attention to his property had every opportunity to begin legal measures
within the statutory time period to have the occupier removed. By virtue of
the Government of Canada joining the action, the time period for adverse
possession was set at 60 years, as opposed to the 20 years demanded by the
City of Vancouver.

25. British Columbia (Att’y Gen.) v. Canada (Att’y Gen.), 11 B.C.R. 258, C.R. [1906]
A.C. 389 at 407.
26. See BARMAN, supra note 13, at 174.
27. See BARMAN, supra note 13, at 176. The action culminated in Canada (Att’y Gen.) v.
Cummings, [1925] 1 D.L.R. 642 (Can.).
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Figure 3: City of Vancouver, 192328
In other words, having both the City and Crown as plaintiffs was crucial, as
the time period that the defendants could argue adverse possession would
span from 20 to 60 years.29 The three cases were ultimately appealed to the
Supreme Court of Canada.
The central issues raised by the city had to do with the duration of the
families’ legal tenure to the land based on the laws of the colonializing
government.30 City officials claimed that the residents moved to the area
after the land had already been discovered and taken by the British Crown.31
The principal piece of evidence was a map created in 1863, around the
contested time of the Dominion reserving the peninsula for military
purposes, which showed only one home on it, not multiple villages.32

28. Stanley Park Squatters, 1923, VANCOUVER IS AWESOME (Dec. 21, 2016),
https://www.vancouverisawesome.com/history/stanley-park-squatters-1923-1933167
[https://perma.cc/788P-QFMH].
29. See BARMAN, supra note 13, at 177; Renisa Mawani, Genealogies of the Land:
Aboriginality, Law, and Territory in Vancouver’s Stanley Park, 14 SOC. & LEGAL STUD. 315,
326 (2005) (examining the factual evidence adduced under the 60 year period).
30. See Canada (Att’y Gen.) v. Cummings, [1926] 1 D.L.R. 52 (SCC 1926).
31. See Mawani, supra note 29, at 326–27.
32. BARMAN, supra note 13, at 188.

10

FORDHAM URB. L.J.

[Vol. L

Without written evidence that satisfied the particular rigidities of colonial
law, the families brought forward multiple witnesses who corroborated the
residence of the families for over 60 years. The superior court judge
disregarded this testimony, describing the “old” witnesses who “contradicted
themselves.”33 At the Court of Appeal, Justice Martin, one of the three
presiding judges, disagreed, describing the testimony as “remarkable and
beyond expectation precise.”34 He said, after a careful examination of the
Indigenous witnesses:
I know of no good reason for placing the testimony of our native Indians at
all on a lower plane than those of the others, and in particular I perceive
none in this case for doubting the substantial accuracy of their testimony in
all essentials. Indeed, in some respects it is remarkable and beyond
expectation precise.35

He concluded, “[i]t is difficult to imagine a stronger position in law than that
of the holder of a possessory title antedating the birth of the colony itself.”36
In 1926, the Supreme Court of Canada disagreed, describing the Indian
testimony as “indecisive” and held that the families were trespassers.37
While the City never forced the families to leave, without secure land rights
or amenities they slowly dwindled and died out, and were entirely gone by
the mid-1950s. Until the early 2000s, the only Indigenous signifiers were
those selected by the parks commission; created by First Nations in northern
British Columbia, they did not reference the Coast Salish villages or sites.38
And, despite their long-standing claims, Coast Salish First Nations have only
been engaged in consultations and dialogue regarding the park since 2011.39
II. CITY POWER AND CITY PARKS
In countries such as the United States and Canada, some cities are
subsumed within the authority of state governments, and can have no
protection against changes to the design and power imposed on them. In the
United States, for example, some cities are subject to state pre-emption on

33. Id. at 207.
34. Id. at 214.
35. Id.
36. See Canada (Att’y Gen.) v. Cummings, [1926] 1 D.L.R. 52 para. 11 (SCC 1926).
37. BARMAN, supra note 13, at 53.
38. See generally Mawani, supra note 29.
39. See Memorandum from Gen. Manager, Vancouver Bd. of Parks & Recreation to Park
Bd. Chair & Comm’rs (Apr. 9, 2018) (on file with Park Bd.),
https://parkboardmeetings.vancouver.ca/2018/20180416/REPORTUnderstandingStanleyPark-DevelopingaComprehensivePlan-20180416.pdf
[https://perma.cc/SX44-QWX8].
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particular issues.40 In Canada, the design of the constitution, whereby
provinces have jurisdiction over “municipal institutions in the Province” has
led municipalities to be called “creatures of the province.”41 This limited
constitutional status represents a particular view of municipal authority
rooted in a doctrine known as “Dillon’s Rule,” a framework of municipal
authority advanced by John Dillion, a nineteenth century American jurist
who objected to purported waste by local governments.42 Dillon’s rule
proposes instead that states and provinces keep a “watchful eye” on local
governments to ensure that resources are not inappropriately used.43
Even so, cities can exercise a great deal of power and their actions have
had a notable effect on Indigenous Peoples. As noted by many scholars,
including Professors Brenna Bhandar and Nick Blomley, planning was
central to early colonizing efforts and it continues to frame cities as places
for private landownership by settlers.44 Professor Libby Porter writes that,
“[p]roperty shapes how cities function, how they look and how we live in
them. And property fragments urban environments. It chops up the landscape
with titles, fences, investment portfolios, development options and planning
zones.”45 That system of property is imposed on Indigenous lands.46 It
entrenches non-Indigenous property rights and excludes the people from
whom the land was taken. Most importantly, property works against the
recognition that cities, too, are Indigenous places.
As noted earlier in this Article, Vancouver is located on unceded land,
which means that the land was never formally surrendered by Coast Salish
First Nations.47 Vancouver’s municipal government planned the city
without involvement from the Coast Salish First Nations, although this is

40. See generally Richard Briffault, The Challenge of the New Preemption, 70 STAN. L.
REV. 1995, 1997 (2018).
41. See Alexandra Flynn, With Great(er) Power Comes Great(er) Responsibility:
Indigenous Rights and Municipal Autonomy, 34 J.L. & SOC. POL’Y 111, 113 (2021); see also
Ron Levi & Mariana Valverde, Freedom of the City: Canadian Cities and the Quest for
Governmental Status, 44 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 409, 411 (2006).
42. See Levi & Valverde, supra note 41.
43. See Eugene Meehan, Q.C. et al., The Constitutional Legal Status of Municipalities
1849-2004: Success Is a Journey, But Also a Destination, 22 NAT’L J. CONST. L. 1, 4–5
(2007); see also Levi & Valverde, supra note 41, at 415–16.
44. See Nicholas Blomley, Making Space for Property, 104 ANNALS ASS’N AM.
GEOGRAPHERS 1291,1292 (2014). See generally BRENNA BHANDAR, COLONIAL LIVES OF
PROPERTY: LAW, LAND, AND RACIAL REGIMES OF OWNERSHIP (2018).
45. Libby Porter, How Can We Meaningfully Recognise Cities as Indigenous Places?,
CONVERSATION (Oct. 4, 2016, 10:39 PM), https://theconversation.com/how-can-wemeaningfully-recognise-cities-as-indigenous-places-65561 [https://perma.cc/X8J3-99UJ].
46. See Jordan Stanger-Ross, Municipal Colonialism in Vancouver: City Planning and
the Conflict Over Indian Reserves, 1928–1950s, 89 CANADIAN HIST. REV. 541, 543 (2008).
47. See generally Harris, supra note 2 (discussing the history of the traditional territories
of the Musqueam, Squamish, and Tsleil-Waututh Coast Salish peoples).
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changing rapidly. In the past decade, the City has shifted its governance
approach in ways that go beyond the actions of other Canadian
municipalities. In 2013, the City of Vancouver announced a “Year of
Reconciliation” and declared support for the UN Declaration on the Rights
of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP), the first municipality to do so.48 A year
later, the “City of Reconciliation framework” called on council and city staff
to “develop appropriate protocols for the City of Vancouver to use in
conducting City business that respect the traditions of welcome, blessing,
and acknowledgement of the territory.”49 At the time, Khelsilem one of the
councillors of Squamish Nation, stated:
[T]he proclamation of unceded territory was in my opinion a gesture by
white politicians doing what they were told would be a good gesture to do
and were genuine in their attempt to do what they thought was right. I think
the most useful critiques of these gestures address the usefulness or nonusefulness of these gestures and what tangible actions could be done instead
(if there are any to be done instead). From that standpoint I’d say this
gesture that completely falls into the definition of colonial politics of
recognition at best give the potential for awareness. But beyond that it’s
empty in providing any form of restitution or repatriation for the
dispossession the City of Vancouver continuously supports by its very
existence.50

More recently, Vancouver has undertaken a review of all city bylaws to
ensure that they conform with UNDRIP.51 And while the city has not
engaged with questions of property, land, or restitution, court decisions have
resulted in the return of reserve lands in central Vancouver to the Squamish
Nation, who are developing a 1,200 unit affordable housing project.52 The
Coast Salish First Nations have also come together in the past ten years to

48. See Motion on Notice: Support for Reconciliation with Aboriginal Peoples, CITY
VANCOUVER
(Feb.
26,
2013),
https://council.vancouver.ca/20130226/documents/motionb3.pdf [https://perma.cc/PX4RX8ZR].
49. Councillor Reimer, Motion for Protocol to Acknowledge First Nations Unceded
Traditional
Territory,
Vancouver
City
Council
(June
25,
2014),
https://council.vancouver.ca/20140625/documents/ptec6.pdf
[https://perma.cc/VDF7ZBVX].
50. This is Khelsilem, Comment to Beyond a Formal Acknowledgement, MAINLANDER
(Jan.
7,
2015),
https://themainlander.com/2015/01/07/beyond-a-formalacknowledgement/comment-page-1/#comment-3080 [https://perma.cc/7NX5-HURF].
51. See UNDRIP Task Force, CITY VANCOUVER, https://vancouver.ca/peopleprograms/undrip-task-force.aspx [https://perma.cc/2XNQ-KHQR] (last visited Aug. 1, 2022).
52. See Vision, SENÁ
̓ KW
̱ , https://senakw.com/vision [https://perma.cc/VCN3-BMTQ]
(last visited Aug. 1, 2022).
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purchase and develop parcels of land, creating small neighbourhoods with
parks, housing, and commercial space.53
The Vancouver Parks and Recreation Board (the “Park Board”) governs
the City’s parks and has its own elected council, with a close economic and
political relationship with the City of Vancouver.54 It was created and
empowered by the City of Vancouver to oversee the development of Stanley
Park and, later, all parks, in the City. Very recently, the City’s Park Board
announced that it was confronting its colonial past. In 2018, the Park Board
approved a “colonial audit” outlining actions by the City dating back to 1888,
including removing entire First Nations communities from their traditional
territories when the city declared jurisdiction over Stanley Park and other
beach areas.55 The Park Board also apologized to the Coast Salish First
Nations for taking away ancestral lands, digging up burial grounds to build
roads and playgrounds, and other damaging actions.56
While the City of Vancouver and the Park Board are limited in their power
to dispose of park lands, the transfer of park land to First Nations has never
been on the table.57 The Park Board hired a reconciliation planner tasked
with advancing goals and creating lasting relationships between the
government and Indigenous communities, using the UN Declaration of
Indigenous Peoples as a guide.58 The Park Board concluded:
One of the core acts of colonialism enacted by settlers is the theft of lands
and removal of entire communities from their ancestral homes. This core
act of colonialism has been undertaken by the Park Board since its inception
– beginning with the declaration of jurisdiction over “Stanley Park,” as well
as beach areas around the City, that were of both cultural significance, and
were home, to local nations. 59

In addressing this colonial history, and based on a multi-step, long-term
approach, the Park Board has affirmed, most recently in 2022, the need to
“[c]ontinue [the] Park Board’s precedent-setting intergovernmental
53. See About Us, MST DEV. CORP., http://mstdevelopment.ca/about-us/
[https://perma.cc/BB73-W6WB] (last visited Sept. 11, 2022).
54. See Vancouver Board of Parks and Recreation, CITY VANCOUVER,
https://vancouver.ca/your-government/vancouver-board-of-parks-and-recreation.aspx
[https://perma.cc/M6UK-LLLX] (last visited Sept. 11, 2022).
55. See Exploring Park Board’s Colonial Roots and Current Practices, supra note 7.
56. See id. at 4.
57. See Vancouver Charter, S.B.C. 1953, c 55, para. 488 (Can. B.C.). Under Section 488
of the Vancouver Charter, “[t]he Board shall have exclusive possession of, and exclusive
jurisdiction and control of all areas designated as permanent public parks of the City . . . and
such areas shall remain as permanent public parks, and possession, jurisdiction and control of
such areas shall be retained by the Board.” Id.
58. See Exploring Park Board’s Colonial Roots and Current Practices, supra note 7, at
4.
59. See id. at 3.
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approach to the future stewardship of Stanley Park and other relevant
lands.”60 This process will take time and ongoing commitment.61
So far, the conversation has not pivoted or considered the repatriation of
lands or changes in ownership. But what if it did? What form could it take?
I look next at personhood as a hypothetical possibility, a legal technology
that has been used in other contexts to address alternative claims to park
ownership.62
III. PERSONHOOD AND COLONIAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
Legal geography acknowledges that “law is an anthropocentric terrain.
Not only is law the product of human actors, it entrenches the interests of
humans over virtually all others and centers the reasonable human person as
a main legal subject.”63 The question is thus “how ‘nature’ and ‘law’ operate
in mutually reinforcing ways to create the key socially constructed,
discursive or epistemological sites through which we collectively make
sense of the world and our place within it.”64 One of the ways that law
constructs itself is in relation to which entities have rights or obligations. In
western legal systems, including in the United States, law centers “persons”
as right-bearing vessels.65

60. Letter from Gen. Manager, Vancouver Bd. of Parks & Recreation, to Park Bd. Chair
&
Comm’rs
1
(Apr.
13,
2022),
https://parkboardmeetings.vancouver.ca/2022/20220425/REPORTMSTFlagsBrocktonPoint-20220425.pdf [https://perma.cc/U23P-FRX8]. See generally letter
from Gen. Manager, Vancouver Bd. of Parks & Recreation, to Park Bd. Chair & Comm’rs
(Apr.
9,
2018),
https://parkboardmeetings.vancouver.ca/2018/20180416/REPORTUnderstandingStanleyPark-DevelopingaComprehensivePlan-20180416.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2GMR-X3MG].
61. See Reconciliation: Mission, Vision, & Values, VANCOUVER BD. PARKS &
RECREATION (Apr. 16, 2018), https://parkboardmeetings.vancouver.ca/files/POLICYParkBoardReconciliation-MissionVisionValues-20180416.pdf
[https://perma.cc/VA4QVACE].
62. Cf. Maneesha Deckha, Initiating a Non-Anthropocentric Jurisprudence: The Rule of
Law and Animal Vulnerability Under a Property Paradigm, 50 ALBERTA L.R. 783, 784 (2013)
(noting that nonhuman animals have been granted rights of life, liberty, and freedom from
torture).
63. Id.
64. Bronwyn Parry, David Delaney, Law and Nature, 33 J. HIST. GEOGRAPHY 701, 702
(2007).
65. See generally Dinah Shelton, Nature as a Legal Person, 22 VERTIGO (2015).
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Personhood Differs Based on Jurisdiction, Form, and Legal
Technicality

Personhood is inextricable from the modern colonial legal system, where
humans and those deemed persons are granted particular rights.66 Those
deemed “persons,” whether human or not, are able to exercise power. As
David Delaney writes, property law establishes power not only over the
owned objects but also in relation to the owning subjects.67 Even where nonhuman entities are deemed legal persons — for example, corporations and
municipalities — there is no displacement of the object (the person)
exercising rights within the colonial legal system.
Personhood is connected to the “rights of nature” movement, which can
be loosely grouped within two families of scholarship. The first, peopledependent personhood, is dependent on human actors. Five decades ago, in
1972, American professor Christopher Stone proposed that the state “give
legal rights to forests, oceans, rivers and other so-called ‘natural objects’ in
the environment – indeed, to the natural environment as a whole.”68 This
article was subsequently cited by dissenting United States Supreme Court
justices in the 1972 case, Sierra Club v Morton.69 Stone argued that legal
personality would grant legal standing and enforceable rights to natural
resources, where the resource (advanced by an interested individual) could
then sue in tort law to receive compensation for damages, to be used for
environmental remediation.70 Other scholars advance what can be
understood as standalone personhood. In contrast to humans asserting
nature’s rights, nature has stand-alone rights without dependence on
assertions of non-humans. This offers a normative realignment of the
subjects and objects of property law. Personhood is thus part and parcel of
law’s power.71 Where nature has been granted personhood status, it “owns”
itself, and is thus able to set its own agenda for actions and interests, based
on whatever decision-making model is established.
Some argue that personhood is a “potentially revolutionary precedent[]
that offer[s] a path forward to redefine relationships between governments,
indigenous peoples and the land in the 21st century.”72 Personhood

66. See generally CHIP COLWELL, PLUNDERED SKULLS AND STOLEN SPIRITS (2017).
67. See DAVID DELANEY, LAW AND NATURE 222 (2003).
68. Christopher Stone, Should Trees Have Standing? – Toward Legal Rights for Natural
Objects, 45 S. CAL. L.R. 450, 456 (1972).
69. See 405 U.S. 727, 742 (1972).
70. See Stone, supra note 68, at 476–77.
71. See generally COLIN DAYAN, THE LAW IS A WHITE DOG: HOW LEGAL RITUALS MAKE
AND UNMAKE PERSONS (2011).
72. Julian Brave NoiseCat, The Western Idea of Private Property is Flawed. Indigenous
Peoples
Have
it
Right,
GUARDIAN
(Mar.
27,
2017),
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initiatives are growing sharply although unevenly across the world, with 39
countries responsible for almost 90% of all initiatives.73 Personhood may be
recognized through a variety of legal mechanisms, including a constitution,
national law, court decision, or local regulation or policy. 74 Motivations for
creating legal personhood, whether specific to a river or another natural
resource, are varied; they may be rooted in Indigenous or religious beliefs,
the human right to a healthy environment, anti-corporate or anti-capitalist
sentiments, contamination or disaster relief, or other reasons.75 As such,
there is no such thing as a single type of designation of legal personhood.
B.

Examples of Personhood Status for Nature: New Zealand and
Colombia

Two early examples illustrate the two main ways that personhood for
nature can be “created” — through enactment by government (New
Zealand), and as determined by courts (Colombia). In New Zealand,
personhood status was first granted to a national park called Te Urewera.
Under the Te Urewera Act 2014, the park became “a legal entity [that] has
all the rights, powers, duties, and liabilities of a legal person.”76 Fee simple
interest in the land is vested in Te Urewera itself77 and is largely
inalienable.78 In September 2017, the Act created board approved Te Kawa
o Te Urewera, a management plan also required under the Act.79 The board
must act on behalf of, and in the name of, Te Urewera,80 and may “consider
and give expression to” Tūhoe knowledge,81 including “tapu me noa,” which
conveys, “in tapu, the concept of sanctity, a state that requires respectful
human behaviour in a place; and in noa, the sense that when the tapu is lifted
from the place, the place returns to a normal state.”82 Two-thirds of the board
membership are Tūhoe.83

https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/mar/27/western-idea-private-propertyflawed-indigenous-peoples-have-it-right [https://perma.cc/KAB9-PZFM].
73. Alex Putzer et. al., Putting the Rights of Nature on the Map. A Quantitative Analysis
of Rights of Nature Initiatives Across the World, J. MAPS 2, 3 (2022).
74. See id.
75. See id.
76. Te Urewera Act 2014, s 11(1) (N.Z.); see also Te Kawa O Te Urewera - English,
Tuhoe, TŪHOE,
https://www.ngaituhoe.iwi.nz/te-kawa-o-te-urewera
[https://perma.cc
/DCX7-D7MP] (last visited Nov. 9, 2022).
77. See Te Urewera Act 2014, s 12(3) (N.Z.).
78. Id. at s 13.
79. See id. at s 2(2).
80. Id. at s 17(a).
81. Id. at s 18(2).
82. Id. at s 18(3).
83. See id. at s 21(2).
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Personhood was a legal and political compromise that followed years of
negotiation between New Zealand’s national government and the Tūhoe
people for authority over and title to the land.84 New Zealand’s
constitutional foundation includes the Treaty of Waitangi, signed on
February 6, 1840 by representatives of the British Crown and Māori chiefs
from the North Island of New Zealand.85 The Tūhoe people never signed
the Treaty of Waitangi and resisted the Crown’s claims to its traditional
homelands.86 Even so, by 1927, the Crown had claimed two-thirds of Tūhoe
lands, including those that became Te Urewera National Park in 1954.87
Personhood in Te Urewara thus represents a compromise, a means of using
New Zealand (rather than Tūhoe) law to create a legal framework for the
210,000 hectares of land.88 Tūhoe do not have title to the lands.89
In contrast, Colombia’s Constitutional Court first recognized the rights of
nature in 2015 in a case involving environmental damage to a river and
watershed,90 stating “rivers, mountains, forests, and the atmosphere must be
protected, not because of their utility to humans but because of their own
rights to exist.”91 The river flows through jungles between Panama and
Colombia.92 Colombia’s Constitutional Courts recognized the Atrato River
Basin’s right to “protection, conservation, maintenance and restoration”
given extreme levels of mercury and cyanide pollution. The river is home to
a number of communities, both Indigenous and Afro-Colombian.93

84. See Andrew Geddis & Jacinta Ruru, Places as Persons: Creating a New Framework
for Māori-Crown Relations, FRONTIERS PUB. L. 298, 298 (Jason NE Varuhas & Shona Wilson
Stark eds., 2019).
85. See Sandra Morrison & Ingrid Huygens, Explainer: The Significance of the Treaty of
Waitangi, CONVERSATION (Feb. 5, 2019), https://theconversation.com/explainer-thesignificance-of-the-treaty-of-waitangi-110982 [perma.cc/J3UZ-5V5K].
86. See Vincent O’Malley, Tūhoe-Crown Settlement – Historical Background, MĀORI L.
REV. (2014), https://maorilawreview.co.nz/2014/10/tuhoe-crown-settlement-historicalbackground/ [https://perma.cc/S2PC-8MZR].
87. See id.
88. See Geddis & Ruru, supra note 84.
89. See Brad Coombes, Nature’s Rights as Indigenous Rights? Mis/recognition through
Personhood
for
Te
Urewera,
OPEN
EDITION
J.
(Jan.
1,
2020),
https://journals.openedition.org/eps/ [https://perma.cc/HA98-GX6K].
90. See Laura Villa, The Importance of the Atrato River in Colombia Gaining Legal
Rights, EARTH L. CENTRE (May 5, 2017), https://www.earthlawcenter.org/blogentries/2017/5/the-importance-of-the-atrato-river-in-colombia-gaining-legal-rights
[https://perma.cc/JH4C-V8GD].
91. See RENATA COLWELL ET AL., ENV’T L. CLINIC, UNIV. VICTORIA, LEGAL PERSONALITY
OF NATURAL FEATURES: RECENT INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS AND APPLICABILITY IN
CANADA 22 (2017), https://www.elc.uvic.ca/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/201702-03-LegalPersonalityNatural-Features_web-version.pdf [https://perma.cc/KW47-8DJZ]
(citing Corte Constitucional, Noviembre 10, 2016, Sentencia T-266/16).
92. See Villa, supra note 90.
93. See COLWELL ET AL., supra note 91.
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Colombia’s recognition of Rio Atrato as a legal person came through the
courts, in November 2016.94 In 2015, a coalition of Indigenous and AfroColombian groups brought the case, alongside an environmental nongovernmental organization, Tierra Digna.95 The plaintiffs brought the case
under Section 86 of the Colombian Constitution, calling for the protection of
constitutional rights by local and national institutions for failing to protect
the “social rule of law.”96
The Colombian Constitutional Court opined that the state has violated
“fundamental rights to life, health, water, food security, the healthy
environment, culture and the territory of ethnic communities” by “failing to
prevent harmful river mining.”97 That Court asserted that the river has rights
to protection, conservation, maintenance, and restoration, with a
corresponding duty on the State to provide them. The Court held that a social
rule of law involves the protection of the environment, including rivers,
forests, food sources, and biodiversity.98
Legal personhood for Rio Atrato differs from Te Urewera. First, the
judgment gave the government “one year to develop a comprehensive plan
to end the pollution and damage being inflicted on the Atrato River
watershed by activities such as deforestation and illegal mining,”99 including
a restoration plan for the river basin, baseline studies, and the
implementation of protective measures.100 Second, in regard to governance,
the judgment instructed the claimant communities to establish joint
guardianship for the Atrato River basin, comprised of one government
representative and one representative from the local Indigenous groups.
Guardians have the responsibility to follow up on the protection and
restoration that the State must provide for the river.101 Rio Atrato’s
guardians receive advice from the Humboldt Institute and the World Wildlife
Foundation, rather than from Indigenous communities.102
Another important feature of legal personhood for Rio Atrato and Te
Urewera involves the engagement with Indigenous legal traditions.

94. David R Boyd, Recognizing the Rights of Nature: Lofty Rhetoric or Legal Revolution,
32 NAT. RES. & ENV’T 13, 17 (2018).
95. See COLWELL ET AL., supra note 91, at 22–23.
96. See Cristy Clark et al., Can You Hear the Rivers Sing? Legal Personhood, Ontology,
and the Nitty-Gritty of Governance, 45 ECOLOGY L.Q. 787, 807 (2019).
97. Susan Bird, Colombia Grants Legal Rights to the Polluted Atrato River, TRUTHOUT
(June 3, 2017), https://truthout.org/articles/colombia-grants-legal-rights-to-the-pollutedatrato-river/ [https://perma.cc/G3EB-AUMM].
98. See Clark et al., supra note 96, at 807.
99. Boyd, supra note 94.
100. See COLWELL ET AL., supra note 91, at 23.
101. Id.
102. Id.
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Examples from New Zealand and Colombia, where green spaces and rivers
located on Indigenous lands are now deemed persons, suggests that
emancipatory property configurations can reimagine relations between
Indigenous peoples and colonial governments. Under this vision, the
contours of law’s definitions are acceptable to colonial property models, but
cognizant of Indigenous values.103 In the case of Te Urewara, the original
goal was the return of the lands to the Tūhoe, which was rejected by the
government. Scholarship on the Act that provides personhood status for Te
Urewara argues that “is not a direct translation of Indigenous conceptions,
but rather a potential straitjacket for Indigenous emancipatory politics.”104
In regard to Rio Atrato, the court’s judgment focuses on repair, centering the
state and humans, rather than giving agency to the river itself. There is no
mention in the judgment of Raizal people’s spiritual relationships with the
Rio Atrato basin or any sacred beings within it, or those of other Indigenous
peoples.105
C.

Personhood at the Local Level

Many local governments in the United States have granted personhood
status to nature through awarding legal rights to nature. As of 2018, more
than three dozen American municipalities in ten different states have passed
ordinances recognizing that nature has rights, including Pittsburgh,
Pennsylvania; Santa Monica, California; and Athens, Ohio.106 The
ordinances are often enacted to oppose industrial activities viewed as causes
of environmental degradation. Most ordinances work by allowing citizens
to file a lawsuit on behalf of nature for any harm caused by the land from
pollution or other harm (like sewage sludge polluting bodies of water). Once
damages are awarded, the municipality or a trust use them to restore
ecosystems.107 These ordinances can be politically successful. An
amendment to Florida’s Orange County Charter was supported by

103. See Te Urewera Act, 2014 (N.Z.).
104. Mihnea Tănăsescu, Rights of Nature, Legal Personality, and Indigenous
Philosophies, TRANSNATIONAL ENV’T L., 429, 429 (2020).
105. COLWELL ET AL., supra note 91, at 23–24.
106. Boyd, supra note 94, at 13.
107. For example, a City of Pittsburgh ordinance states that: “Natural communities and
ecosystems, including, but not limited to, wetlands, streams, rivers, aquifers, and other water
systems, possess inalienable and fundamental rights to exist and flourish within the City of
Pittsburgh. Residents of the City shall possess legal standing to enforce those rights on behalf
of those natural communities and ecosystems.” P ITTSBURGH, PA., CODE § VI, art. I, ch.
618.03(b)
(2010),
https://pittsburgh.legistar.com/LegislationDetail.aspx?ID=766814&GUID=3306C0FDCF64-4F19-9D73-052C69CB9738&Options=ID|Text|&Search=gas
[https://perma.cc/X2WN-TQQU].
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referendum in 2020 with 89% voting in favour of the rights of nature
provision.108 Personhood at the local level both affirms a municipality’s
beliefs on the protection of nature and provides a legal basis for objecting to
alleged environmental harm.
Ordinances are not the only legal mechanism used to recognize
personhood. In Euanitshit, Quebec, a province of Canada, the Minganie
Regional Municipality and the Innu Council of Ekuanitshit created a Joint
Declaration stating that the Magpie River had nine rights, among them the
right to flow, maintain biodiversity, be free from pollution, and to sue.109
Guardians would be appointed by the Minganie Regional Municipality and
the Innu Council of Ekuanitshit to advocate on behalf of the river.110 The
responsibilities of the guardians include the ability to research, apply and
comply with traditional Innu knowledge, introduce conservation planning
such as species protection, management and recovery, and participate in
consultations on behalf of the river.111 Although the Declaration was only
recently implemented, the designation of personhood represents an
important step for the Indigenous Nations involved.112 However, as
Anishinaabe-Métis Professor and lawyer Aimée Craft states, some
Indigenous groups are engaging with the rights of nature movement
because it aligns with their own legal systems, “[b]ut it’s not a perfect
fit” for all. 113
The ʔEsdilagh First Nations and Tsilhqot’in Council of Chiefs in British
Columba, Canada, passed the ʔEsdilagh Sturgeon River Law in 2020, stating
that the Fraser River was a person, which has suffered from pollution and

108. Press Release, Ctr. For Democratic & Env’t Rights, First in the U.S.: “Rights of
Nature” State Constitutional Amendment Filed in Florida to Protect Waterways (June 2,
2021),
https://www.centerforenvironmentalrights.org/news/first-in-the-us-rights-of-nature-stateconstitutional-amendment-filed-in-florida-to-protect-waterways
[https://perma.cc/H9T9WE2M].
109. See Justine Townsend et al., Rights For Nature: How Granting A River ‘Personhood’
Could Help Protect It, CONVERSATION (June 3, 2021), https://theconversation.com/rights-fornature-how-granting-a-river-personhood-could-help-protect-it-157117
[https://perma.cc/ZT9T-LXWN].
110. See id.
111. See id.; see also Susan Nerberg, I am Mutehekau Shipu: A River’s Journey To
Personhood In Eastern Quebec, CANADIAN GEOGRAPHIC (Apr. 8, 2022),
https://canadiangeographic.ca/articles/i-am-mutehekau-shipu-a-rivers-journey-topersonhood-in-eastern-quebec/ [https://perma.cc/5L8P-DP9D].
112. See id.
113. Krista Hessey, How A River In Quebec Won The Right To Be A Legal Person, GLOB.
NEWS (Oct. 2, 2021), https://globalnews.ca/news/8230677/river-quebec-legal-person/
[https://perma.cc/V2GU-5ZS2].
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dangerously low fish stocks.114 Article 4(1)(f) of that law states that:
“People, animals, fish, plants, the nen [land], and the tu [water] have rights
in the decisions about their care and use that must be considered and
respected.”115 The ʔEsdilagh Government may make orders, or regulations,
or issue permits or other authorizations for persons, projects, or proposed
projects that may implicate the river.
Unlike the examples in New Zealand and Colombia, local ordinances are
all vulnerable to court action. In the United States, an ordinance introduced
by Grant Township, a rural Pennsylvania town, that enacted a rights of nature
ordinance, has been in court since 2013 to protect natural resources after a
permit was issued by state and federal governments to allow resource
extraction.116 At question is whether the state — not municipality — has the
authority to regulate oil and gas development.117 Likewise, the district court
for the Northern District of Ohio held that the Lake Erie Bill of Rights, which
was enacted by residents of Toledo, Ohio, was invalid under the United
States Constitution.118 The district court concluded that three provisions of
the Bill of Rights were unconstitutionally vague, therefore infringing the
Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution which protects the
right to due process.119 Lawyers have already concluded that the Magpie
River resolution may be subject to dispute, especially as there are no plans
to recognize rights of nature in the Constitution.120 Likewise, it is unclear

114. See TSÎ LHQOT’IN NATION, ʔESDILAGH STURGEON RIVER LAW (2020),
http://files.harmonywithnatureun.org/uploads/upload995.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9CR9QXZZ].
115. Id.
116. CMTY. ENV’T LEGAL DEF. FUND, ‘Unrepentant’: Grant Township Refuses to Bend to
the Fracking Industry, CMTY. ENV’T LEGAL DEF. FUND, https://celdf.org/grant/
[https://celdf.org/grant/] (last visited Nov. 9, 2022); see also Complaint at, Pa. Gen. Energy
v. Grant Twp., Case No. 1:14-cv-00209-JFM (W.D. Pa., Aug. 8, 2014). PGE sued Grant
Township in federal district court to overturn the community’s ordinance. PGE succeeded in
a motion for sanctions against the Township for “frivolous, unfounded, harassing pleadings
and motions in pursuit of . . . illegitimate ends, thereby increasing litigation costs, abusing
process, and wasting judicial resources.” Opinion & Order at 5, id. (Jan. 5, 2018). See
generally Cmty. Env’t Legal Def. Fund, A Court Hearing for Grant Township: Eight Years
Later, and Still No Injection Well, CMTY. ENV’T LEGAL DEF. FUND (May 4, 2022),
https://celdf.org/2022/05/a-court-hearing-for-grant-township-eight-years-later-and-still-noinjection-well [https://perma.cc/PZ4F-3JHX].
117. See id.
118. See Brigit Rollins, Turning the Tides: Judge Finds Lake Erie Bill of Rights
Unconstitutional,
NAT’L
AGRIC.
L.
CTR.
(Mar.
4,
2020),
https://nationalaglawcenter.org/turning-the-tides-judge-finds-lake-erie-bill-of-rightsunconstitutional/ [https://perma.cc/DHC7-B4RZ].
119. See id.
120. See Elizabeth Raymer, Quebec’s Magpie River is Granted Personhood, CANADIAN
LAW. (Mar. 9, 2021), https://www.canadianlawyermag.com/practice-areas/esg/quebecsmagpie-river-is-granted-
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how Canadian governments and regulators will react to Indigenous
recognition of personhood in relation to the Fraser River.121
IV. CAUTIOUS PERSONHOOD: INDIGENOUS LAWS AT THE CENTER
There are reasons to be cautious about a sweeping endorsement of
personhood in relation to parks generally and Stanley Park in particular.
First, many advocates of personhood emphasize the promise of
environmental protection without reference to or reflection on Indigenous
laws. Professor David Boyd, UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights and
Environment suggests that personhood could strengthen the legal protection
that “generations of environmental laws have failed to provide,” rather than
natural resources acting as a commodity and a piece of property to be owned
and discarded as desired by the owner.122
However, personhood is rooted in a certain conception of property and
ownership. In some Indigenous legal orders, property is not “owned” and
cannot be ceded. Indigenous law may be premised on a “reciprocal
relationship with the Earth.”123 Professor Robin Wall Kimmerer, who wrote
Braiding Sweetgrass about bringing together Indigenous ways of knowing
and scientific knowledge,124 states that, “[l]and is not capital to which we
have property rights; rather it is the place for which we have moral
responsibility in reciprocity for its gift of life.”125 As Indigenous leader,
Grand Chief Harold Turner, stated:
The Creator gave us life, inherent rights and laws which governed our
relationship with nations and all peoples in the spirit of coexistence. This
continues to this day. We as original caretakers, not owners of this great
country now called Canada, never gave up our rights to govern ourselves
and thus are sovereign nations. We, as sovereign nations and caretakers of
Mother Earth, have a special relationship with the land. Our responsibilities

personhood/353752#:~:text=In%20February%20the%20regional%20county,and%20to%20t
ake%20legal%20action [https://perma.cc/U9C7-3UFF] (quoting a legal expert’s uncertainty
over the “weight behind the legal argument [derived from the resolution]”).
121. See TŜILHQOT’IN NATION, supra note 114.
122. Juliette Deck, Rights for Rivers, MCGILL INT’L REV. (May 16, 2021),
https://www.mironline.ca/rights-for-rivers/ [https://perma.cc/7EQ2-2HRX].
123. Nii Gaani Aki Inini – Leading Earth Man (Dave Courchene), Sharing Indigenous
Knowledge on Survival in Times of Climate Change, TURTLE LODGE (Nov. 18, 2016),
http://www.turtlelodge.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/Sharing-Indigenous-Knowledgeon-Survival-in-Times-of-Climate-Change-Turtle-Lodge-Nov18.2016.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6SNG-TYS9].
124. See Robin W. Kimmerer, Greed Does Not Have to Define Our Relationship to Land:
On Choosing to Belong to a Place, LITERARY HUB (June 4, 2020), https://lithub.com/robinwall-kimmerer-greed-does-not-have-to-define-our-relationship-to-land/
[https://perma.cc/5ANK-7S6B].
125. Id.
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to Mother Earth are the foundation of our spirituality, culture and
traditions . . . . Our ancestors did not sign a real estate deal, as you cannot
give away something you do not own.126

Second, personhood may not be consistent with Indigenous worldviews
or have Indigenous support, and may not necessarily be rooted in Indigenous
legal orders or reflective of Indigenous priorities.127 Professor Melany
Banks notes the challenges in recognizing Aboriginal title under Canadian
law, as the Crown has underlying title.”128 The granting of personhood status
could instead “allow is for the de-coupling of the question of the sovereignty
of Indigenous people from the process of protecting the land.”129 Similarly,
Professor Carwyn Jones asserts that using legal personality “confirms that
Māori legal traditions will not be recognized on their own terms but instead
only through the closest equivalent from the Western legal tradition.”130 In
other words, personhood is a legal compromise that is not necessarily rooted
in Indigenous law.131
In relation to Stanley Park, Coast Salish First Nations have not endorsed
legal personhood in the context of Stanley Park, nor confirmed that it is an
appropriate way to reflect their interests. The legal system that adopts it
constructs particular rights, obligations, powers, and limitations in relation
to the “personhood” designation. It is crucial to ask what personhood is
meant to accomplish, who is asking for it, and the intentions behind it.
Personhood requires that we also need to be mindful of geographic, cultural,
social, historical, and legal differences.132 The specific spaces of Stanley
Park have their own unique contexts, with different nations, laws, and
significances. There are multiple First Nations involved, each with their own
governance models and peoples that have a role to play in contemplation of
legal technologies. There are risks of superficially adopting institutional
responses developed in radically distinct contexts while expecting identical
results.

126. ROYAL COMMISSION ABORIGINAL PEOPLES, REPORT OF THE ROYAL COMMISSION ON
ABORIGINAL PEOPLES, VOL 2: RESTRUCTURING THE RELATIONSHIP 428 (1996),
https://data2.archives.ca/e/e448/e011188230-02.pdf [https://perma.cc/A2VX-XPW6].
127. See Mihnea Tanasescu, Nature Advocacy and the Indigenous Symbol, 24 ENV’T
VALUES 105, 115 (2015).
128. Melany L. Banks, Aboriginal Title or Legal Personhood for Land?, 2 CANADIAN
SOC’Y FOR STUDY PRAC. ETHICS 1, 8 (2018).
129. Id. at 16.
130. CARWYN JONES, NEW TREATY, NEW TRADITION: RECONCILING NEW ZEALAND AND
MĀORI LAW 98 (2016).
131. See Banks, supra note 128, at 12.
132. See Cristy Clark et al., Can You Hear the Rivers Sing? Legal Personhood, Ontology,
and the Nitty-Gritty of Governance, 45 ECOLOGY L.Q. 787, 794 (2019).
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Third, as Professors Eve Tuck and Wayne Yang warn, “settler moves to
innocence are those strategies or positionings that attempt to relieve the
settler of feelings of guilt or responsibility without giving up land or power
or privilege, without having to change much at all.”133 Legal personhood
can be introduced without changing power relations. Professor Glen
Coulthard cautions that:
You’re never going to gain the full recognition of your freedom from your
oppressor. They will only recognize you to the extent that it serves their
own interests. The effect that that recognition being given to you has on the
dominated or the colonized is that they come to see that gift of recognition
as a form of justice or decolonization itself. You think recognition is
actually freedom and decolonization, but it’s really colonization in a new
form.134

In the context of Stanley Park and parks broadly speaking, there are
significant limitations on granting a form of personhood that goes beyond
symbolism to shifts real power to Indigenous peoples.135 Personhood
without legal teeth would embody the “settler move to innocence” that Tuck
and Yang outline; that mere veneer has replaced dialogue, with a rush to
conclude the difficult task of confronting colonialism within cities. Truly
engaging with law, Indigeneity, and parks in relation to Stanley Park means
confronting the use of trespass claims to displace Coast Salish residents and
the use of municipal laws to allow the City and Park Board to govern Stanley
Park for centuries without acknowledging Coast Salish people. It would
involve ongoing and committed dialogue to affirm that personhood was the
appropriate designation under Indigenous as well as Canadian law.
CONCLUSION
This Article has considered personhood status for parks, with a specific
focus on Stanley Park in Vancouver. Personhood can shift the way in which
natural resources are understood in law, from an object of property to a
subject of property. The resource itself can now set its own agenda and
advance its rights through stewards or guardians acting on its behalf. This
has enormous potential for environmental protection in particular.
Personhood can also shift the governance of natural resources from colonial
governments to Indigenous populations, as evidenced in New Zealand. As

133. Eve Tuck & K. Wayne Yang, Decolonization is not a Metaphor, 1 DECOLONIZATION:
INDIGENEITY, EDUC. & SOC’Y 1, 10 (2012).
134. H.G. Hamilton, Beyond a Formal Acknowledgement, MAINLANDER (Jan. 7, 2015),
https://themainlander.com/2015/01/07/beyond-a-formal-acknowledgement/comment-page1/#comment-3080 [https://perma.cc/CXS5-U4KB] (quoting This is Khelsilem’s comment).
135. See Banks, supra note 128; JONES, supra note 130.
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the examples of Te Urewara and Rio Atrato show, success is especially
evident at the national scale.
In the context of local governments, the potential of personhood to
meaningfully advance Indigenous rights is less certain. Local ordinances,
where judicially tested, have been overturned by courts. In the Canadian
context, personhood is a more recent phenomenon, and it remains unclear
how courts would endorse or apply personhood given the constitutional
status of local governments. Moreover, First Nations have played a pivotal
role in determinations of personhood in both the Magpie and Fraser Rivers.
In this thought experiment — could Stanley Park be a person? — I suggest
cautious personhood. If personhood is appropriate under the respective laws
of the Coast Salish First Nations, Indigenous involvement is a precondition,
with Indigenous laws necessary to affirm Stanley Park as a person. Such
actions would de-center the city itself as the granter of rights under their own
terms, strengthen the personhood designation, and ensure that personhood is
not a settler rush to innocence.

